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Imaging Genetics for Our Neurogenetic 
Future 
Daniel Z. Buchman & Judy Illes* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, Tairyan and Illes outlined the potential challenges 
posed by the growing possibility of combining genetic and 
neuroimaging information to improve diagnostic and predictive 
testing of people with disorders affecting the central nervous 
system.1 Here, we continue that discussion with a specific focus 
on the potential power and utility of such combined 
technologies to accurately predict psychiatric illness, 
particularly schizophrenia. We review the science of imaging 
genetics, discuss related ethical issues, such as how 
endophenotypes construct an at-risk profile, and examine 
clinical ethics issues surrounding early intervention in the 
context of the emerging capability. We consider how individuals 
diagnosed with schizophrenia may embody knowledge from 
their brains and genomes into an objective-self. We discuss 
possible implications of imaging genetics for the law and how 
use of the combined technologies may impact issues of justice. 
Finally, we argue that while imaging genetics remains a purely 
laboratory technique today, its potential social uses require 
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careful reflection on how the knowledge gained from it may be 
constructed and interpreted by clinicians, patients, legal 
scholars, and the lay public. 
II.  THE SCIENCE OF IMAGING GENETICS 
Brain activation studies combining genetic information and 
brain signals from human subjects—now known as imaging 
genetics—were first conducted in early 2000.2 These studies 
relied on combined information about the DNA of people and 
changes in metabolic activity or blood oxygenation as measured 
during experiments that involved functional imaging of the 
brain.3 Susan Bookheimer and colleagues, for example, showed 
that results on functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
vary depending on the genetic risk of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) 
and may predict the course of cognitive decline.4 Eric Reiman 
and colleagues also described the use of fMRI, as well as 
positron emission tomography (PET), to study brain changes 
associated with aging in persons with and without the 
apolipoprotein E (APOE) 4 allele, an allele associated with risk 
of AD.5 These results, along with others using AD as an early 
clinical model, suggested that the dual-technology approach 
could provide early biomarkers for the disease even before the 
onset of amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles, possibly 
improve disease tracking, and advance prevention strategies.6 
The promise of this new, combined capability quickly 
unleashed a series of studies, such as those on APOE and 
memory systems, catechol-o-methyltransferase and the 
                                                          
 2. Susan Y. Bookheimer et al., Patterns of Brain Activation in People at 
Risk for Alzheimer’s Disease, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 450, 450 (2000). 
 3. Id. at 451. 
 4. Id. at 455. 
 5. Eric M. Reiman, Linking Brain Imaging and Genomics in the Study of 
Alzheimer’s Disease and Aging, 1097 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 94, 102–105 
(2007); Eric M. Reiman et al., Declining Brain Activity in Cognitively Normal 
Apolipoprotein E ε4 Heterozygotes: A Foundation for Using Positron Emission 
Tomography to Efficiently Test Treatments to Prevent Alzheimer’s Disease, 98 
PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. U.S. 3334, 3335 (2001). 
 6. See John M. Ringman, What the Study of Persons at Risk for Familial 
Alzheimer’s Disease Can Tell Us About the Earliest Stages of the Disorder: A 
Review, 18 J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY & NEUROLOGY 228, 231–32 (2005);  Eun 
Kyoung Ryu & Xiaoyuan Chen, Development of Alzheimer’s Disease Imaging 
Agents for Clinical Studies, 13 FRONTIERS BIOSCIENCES 777, 784 (2008); Bart 
N.M. van Berckel & Philip Scheltens, Getting a Grip on Alzheimer’s Disease: 
Imaging Amyloid in the Brain, 6 LANCET NEUROLOGY 204, 205 (2007). 
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prefrontal cortex, and 5-HTT and the amygdala.7 Several 
studies focused on common gene variants known to affect 
cognitive and behavioral processes within the normal range, 
and others on conditions such as attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD),8 depression,9 obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD),10 anxiety and stress,11 and schizophrenia.12 Ahmed 
Harriri and colleagues used fMRI to study emotional behavior 
(anxiety, response to fear) in healthy volunteers with different 
5-HTT genotypes, as well as a susceptibility gene for affective 
disorders.13 They found that participants carrying the less 
efficient s allele of the 5-HTT-promoter gene had an increased 
amygdala response to fearful stimuli in comparison to subjects 
homozygous for the l allele.14 
These developments represent a new era in predictive 
medicine. The actual term “predictive medicine” has been 
increasingly used by Muin J. Khoury and colleagues to describe 
new approaches in genomic medicine, where information 
extracted from an individual’s genome identifies whether or not 
the person is at an increased risk of developing a specific 
condition, such as mutations of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
                                                          
 7. See generally Venkata S. Mattay & Terry E. Goldberg, Imaging 
Genetic Influences in Human Brain Function, 14 CURRENT OPINION 
NEUROBIOLOGY 239 (2004) (describing a number of studies using different 
brain imaging techniques to explore the association between genetic mutations 
and brain function). 
 8. See Martina T. Mitterschiffthaler et al., Applications of Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging in Psychiatry, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE 
IMAGING 851, 851–53 (2006). 
 9. Id. at 853–54. 
 10. Id. at 854–57. 
 11. Ke Xu et al., Imaging Genomics Applied to Anxiety, Stress Response, 
and Resiliency, 4 NEUROINFORMATICS 51 passim (2006). 
 12. See Guiseppe Blasi & Allesandro Bertolino, Imaging Genomics and 
Response to Treatment with Antipsychotics in Schizophrenia, 3 
NEUROTHERAPEUTICS 117 (2006); Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg & Daniel R. 
Weinberger, Intermediate Phenotypes and Genetic Mechanisms of Psychiatric 
Disorders, 7 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 818 (2006). 
 13. Ahmed R. Hariri et al., Imaging Genetics: Perspectives from Studies of 
Genetically Driven Variation in Serotonin Function and Corticolimbic Affective 
Processing, 59 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 888, 889 (2006) [hereinafter Hariri et 
al., Imaging Genetics]; Ahmed R. Hariri et al., A Susceptibility Gene for 
Affective Disorders and the Response of the Human Amygdala, 62 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 146, 146–47 (2005) [hereinafter Hariri et al., Susceptibility 
Gene]. 
 14. Hariri et al., Imaging Genetics, supra note 13, at 891; Hariri et al., 
Susceptibility Gene, supra note 13, at 148. 
  
 
in breast cancer.15 Identifying high-risk candidates allows for 
early intervention and disease management. 
The alignment of results from imaging genetics on 
neurodegenerative disease and psychiatric disorders supports 
the hypothesis that the combined method has an 
unprecedented power to predict the development of certain 
diseases and risky behaviors.16 Imaging genetics could be used 
to predict the onset of psychiatric conditions, personality traits, 
and mental and emotional capacities in a more powerful way 
than ever before. At this time, however, there still remains 
much to be studied. Causes of psychiatric conditions are vague 
at best, and even categorizing disorders remains a significant 
challenge. Thus, it is realistic and prudent to anticipate 
increasing study and use of imaging genetics in the years to 
come,17 much like other innovations in genetics and 
neuroscience separately. It is also imperative to anticipate the 
ethical, social, legal, and clinical problems posed by imaging 
genetics and to critically examine the value of imaging genetics 
to accomplish outcomes proposed. 
III.  THE ETHICS OF IMAGING GENETICS 
Recent advances in knowledge about the neurogenetic 
contributions to mental illness have provided an impetus for 
the neuroscience, genetics, and medical communities to 
contribute to ongoing philosophical, ethical, and legal debates.18 
Ethical issues as they apply separately to genetics and 
neuroimaging have been a growing focus for applied ethics 
research, which has contributed to the rise of particular 
subfields of biomedical ethics focused on the ethics of emerging 
                                                          
 15. See Muin J. Khoury et al., The Continuum of Translation Research in 
Genomic Medicine: How Can We Accelerate the Appropriate Integration of 
Human Genome Discoveries into Health Care and Disease Prevention?, 9 
GENETICS MED. 665, 668–69 (2007); Muin J. Khoury et al., An Epidemiologic 
Assessment of Genomic Profiling for Measuring Susceptibility to Common 
Diseases and Targeting Interventions, 6 GENETICS MED. 38, 43–44 (2004); 
Muin J. Khoury et al., Population Screening in the Age of Genomic Medicine, 
348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 50, 50 (2003). 
 16. Mattay & Goldberg, supra note 7, at 239. 
 17. See George J. Annas, Foreword: Imagining a New Era of 
Neuroimaging, Neuroethics, and Neurolaw, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 163, 163–64 
(2007) (discussing the prospective legal uses of neuroimaging). 
 18. Emily R. Murphy & Judy Illes, Neuroethics and Psychiatry: New 
Collaborations for Emerging Challenges, 37 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 798, 803 
(2007). 
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technologies, such as genethics and neuroethics.19 Here, we 
examine the ethical issues raised by imaging genetics 
technologies through the lens of biological psychiatry 
(biopsychiatry). Biopsychiatry is a subfield within medicine 
concerned with the function of the central nervous system in 
mental illness. Since neuroethics is concerned, in part, with 
ethical issues arising in the application of technologies in the 
brain sciences, biopsychiatry falls within the scope of 
neuroethics.20 
In the past, we and others with interest in neuroethics and 
biopsychiatry have discussed the ethical dimensions of genetics 
compared to other approaches to understanding brain health 
and illness.21 In one study, Tairyan and Illes performed a 
comprehensive Medline literature search to explore if ethics 
has had a presence in journal articles using the specific term 
“imaging genetics” and found no relevant peer-reviewed 
publications.22 To our knowledge, the only publication with 
content specifically addresses the intersection of ethics and 
imaging genetics is a book chapter by Turhan Canli.23 This 
chapter argues that the future integration of genetic and 
neuroimaging data would predict narrowly defined forms of 
behavior better than self-report and other behavioral 
measures.24 In response, Tairyan and Illes developed a model 
building directly on the work of Joshua L. Roffman and 
colleagues.25 Following the Roffman et al. continuum from 
                                                          
 19. See id. at 799. 
 20. Neil Levy & Steve Clark, Neuroethics and Psychiatry, 21 CURRENT 
OPINION PSYCHIATRY 568, 568 (2008). 
 21. See, e.g., Thomas Fuchs, Ethical Issues in Neuroscience, 19 CURRENT 
OPINION PSYCHIATRY 600, 601–602 (2006); Judy Illes et al., ELSI Priorities for 
Brain Imaging, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at W24, W27–28, W29–
30; Judy Illes, et al., From Neuroimaging to Neuroethics, 6 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE, 205, 205 (2003); Judy Illes, Neuroethics in a New Era of 
Neuroimaging, 14 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY, 1739, 1739–40 (2003); Katherine 
I. Morley et al., Genetic Screening for Susceptibility to Depression: Can We and 
Should We?, 38 AUSTRALIAN & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 73, 77–78 (2004). 
 22. Tairyan & Illes, supra note 1, at 13. 
 23. Turhan Canli, When Genes and Brains Unite: Ethical Implications of 
Genomic Neuroimaging, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 169–83 (Judy Illes ed., 2006). 
 24. Id. at 181. 
 25. Tairyan & Illes, supra note 1, at 2–5. For further information on what 
Tairyan and Illes’s model is based on, see Joshua L. Roffman et al., 
Neuroimaging-Genetic Paradigms: A New Approach to Investigate the 
Pathophysiology and Treatment of Cognitive Deficits in Schizophrenia, 14 
  
 
genes to clinical features with neuroimaging at the interface, 
Tairyan and Illes modified the original framework to include 
some potential ethical issues.26 These include the proposed 
challenges of disease differentiation, incidental findings, values 
of privacy and autonomy, societal beliefs and attitudes, 
resource allocation for research and health care, and 
commercialization.27 Similarly to the result of the Roffman et 
al. continuum that produces clinical practice considerations, 
Tairyan and Illes point to preliminary considerations for health 
care, social justice, and policy.28 
Deeper reflection on the ethics of imaging genetics in 
biopsychiatry is a logical next step. An ethically responsible 
approach to address the possible social, clinical, and legal 
implications of current scientific research will require an 
assessment of the proposed promises and potential outcomes of 
that research. A close examination of how knowledge produced 
by imaging genetics may have an impact on the identity of the 
individual will facilitate thinking of how the law, society, and 
psychiatry define the normal brain and mental illness, and 
label someone as “at risk.” For example, a statistical deviation 
from the norm in psychiatric imaging research does not 
necessarily confirm pathology29 (for example, depression), or 
rather, somewhat rhetorically, does not confirm that one has a 
“depressed” brain as opposed to a “normal” brain.30 There is a 
tendency toward this binary distinction even though a so-called 
“normal” brain has yet to be described empirically. Imaging 
genetics may consequently lead to a paradigmatic shift in 
psychiatric classification by constructing “normal” and 
“abnormal” from a complex integration of correlations statistics 
and risk ratios. 
How might advances in imaging genetics provide empirical 
information advancing the understanding of human 
subjectivity and the self, as well as the application of emerging 
predictive technologies in biological psychiatry? Psychiatric 
illness may highlight the basis of human subjectivity, such as 
                                                          
HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 78 (2006). 
 26. Tairyan & Illes, supra note 1, at 3. 
 27. Id. at 4. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Alison C. Boyce, Neuroimaging in Psychiatry: Evaluating the Ethical 
Consequences for Patient Care, 23 BIOETHICS 349, 350 (2009). 
 30. See Joseph Dumit, Is It Me or My Brain? Depression and 
Neuroscientific Facts, 24 J. MED. HUMAN. 35, 37 (2003). 
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the neurological and genetic underpinnings of selfhood. We will 
specifically examine these questions using the current 
diagnostic construct of schizophrenia from the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV)31 as a model. 
A.  THE SCHIZOPHRENIA SPECTRUM AND IMAGING GENETICS 
Schizophrenia affects up to 1 percent of the population, is 
up to 81 percent heritable, and is characterized by 
hallucinations, delusions, and cognitive deficits.32 Many 
individuals who experience symptoms of schizophrenia have a 
difficult time negotiating their sense of integrated and active 
intentionality.33 More specifically, thoughts, actions, and the 
self may be perceived as under the control of an external force 
or being.34 Conversely, the self may be perceived as 
transcendent, omnipotent, or even prophetic.35 Schizophrenia is 
a useful case example because of the extensive research into 
genetics and neuroscience separately and jointly, the major 
health impact on the population, the putative role of biological 
factors in its etiology, and the complex interaction of both 
genetics and environment in the causation and pathogenesis of 
disease. 
We restrict our discussion of schizophrenia to the 
prodromal phase that occurs prior to the onset of symptoms, 
when the individual first notices some change in him or her 
self, and the first episode or break. The first episode tends to 
occur in men in their late teens or early twenties and in women 
a few years later.36 Depending on the legal age of adulthood in 
a person’s jurisdiction, individuals may still be a minor when 
symptoms appear. For our purposes, the prodromal phase 
represents the core features of schizophrenia, as opposed to the 
                                                          
 31. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 298 (4th ed. Text Revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-
TR]. 
 32. Patrick F. Sullivan et al., Schizophrenia as a Complex Trait: Evidence 
from a Meta-Analysis of Twin Studies, 60 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1187, 
1190 (2003). 
 33. Thomas Fuchs, The Temporal Structure of Intentionality and Its 
Disturbance in Schizophrenia, 40 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 229, 234 (2007). 
 34. Id. at 233–34. 
 35. See Louis A. Sass, Schizophrenia, Self-Consciousness and the Modern 
Mind, in MODELS OF THE SELF 319, 320 (Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear 
eds., 1999). 
 36. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 31, at 307. 
  
 
symptoms that individuals suffer in a more chronic stage of 
disease that may be confounded by years of social isolation and 
the long-term effects of older generation anti-psychotics.37 
Given the possible predictive power of imaging genetics, and 
the possible benefit to the individual of early detection and 
intervention, it is here that we focus our attention. 
B.  ENDOPHENOTYPES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF RISK 
Identifying individuals at risk for a particular medical or 
social condition such as depression or poverty is common 
practice in many fields and not unique to psychiatry. In the 
clinical neurosciences, recent focus has been placed on 
biomarkers and endophenotypes. A biomarker is a biological 
marker that is “objectively measured and evaluated as an 
indicator of normal biological processes, pathogenic processes, 
or pharmacological responses to a therapeutic intervention.”38 
Endophenotypes are “intermediate phenotypes . . . measurable 
(though often subclinical), heritable biological markers that 
relate both to underlying pathophysiology and to clinical 
symptoms.”39 In the past, both psychiatric research and clinical 
practice have encountered difficulties with identifying a 
biological vulnerability to this mental illness. The creation of 
endophenotypes may ease this complexity by identifying 
biological markers indicating a susceptibility to developing a 
mental illness prior to the onset of symptoms.40 The use of 
neuroimaging in the endophenotype analysis of complex 
psychiatric diseases may shed light on the biological 
mechanisms underlying these conditions.41 As expected, 
endophenotypes are becoming an increasingly critical notion in 
biological psychiatry. 
Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders are currently 
                                                          
 37. See DAN ZAHAVI, SUBJECTIVITY AND SELFHOOD 134 (2005) (“[E]arly 
symptoms detectable in the first (initial) prodromal stage . . . might, in a much 
sharper manner, express the essential core of the illness.”); Josef Parnas & 
Louis A. Sass, Self, Solipsism, and Schizophrenic Delusions, 8 PHIL. 
PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 101, 117, 117n.1 (2001) (describing the prodromal 
phase as “heralding the onset of imminent psychosis” and suggesting that 
etiological research focus on the early stages of the disease). 
 38. Biomarkers Definitions Working Group, Biomarkers and Surrogate 
Endpoints: Preferred Definitions and Conceptual Framework, 69 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 89, 91 (2001). 
 39. Roffman, supra note 25, at 79. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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defined and diagnosed based on symptoms as classified by the 
DSM-IV and the International Classification of Disease (ICD-
10)42, in addition to the reports of patients and their families. 
Accordingly, identifying a biomarker or endophenotype through 
neuroimaging genetic tools, rather than relying on symptoms 
checklists and clinical phenomenology, may provide a more 
precise method of prediction and diagnosis. 
Recent studies of imaging genetics in schizophrenia have 
focused on the biomarkers of COMT, 43 PCM1, 44 and DISC1.45 
Michael F. Egan and colleagues have, examined the 
relationship between functional polymorphisms of the catechol-
O-methyltransferase (COMT) gene and regulation of prefrontal 
dopamine that is associated with the genetic risk of 
schizophrenia.46 The authors studied the effect of COMT 
genotype on prefrontal physiology during a working memory 
task and found that a low met allele load (number of 
mutations) consistently predicted a more efficient physiological 
response in the prefrontal cortex.47 
Several imaging studies with adolescents believed to be at 
high risk for schizophrenia found notable structural and 
functional impairments observed in key brain regions.48 
                                                          
 42. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL 
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEM (10th revision 
2007), available at http://apps.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icd10online/. 
 43. Michael F. Egan et al., Effect of COMT Val108/158 Met Genotype on 
Frontal Lobe Function and Risk for Schizophrenia, 98 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
U.S. 6917, 6920 (2001). 
 44. Hugh M. D. Gurling et al., Genetic Association and Brain Morphology 
Studies and the Chromosome 8p22 Pericentriolar Material1 (PCM1) Gene in 
Susceptibility to Schizophrenia, 63 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 844, 849 
(2006). 
 45. Neeltje E. van Haren et al., Genetic Genes and Structural Brain 
Imaging in Schizophrenia, 21 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHIATRY 161, 163 (2008). 
 46. Egan et al., supra note 43, at 6917. 
 47. Id. at 6919. 
 48. See, e.g., Stefan J. Borgwardt et al., Structural Brain Abnormalities in 
Individuals with an At-Risk Mental State Who Later Develop Psychosis, 51 
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY s69, s72–73 (2007); Sven Haller et al., Can Cortical 
Thickness Asymmetry Analysis Contribute to Detection of At-Risk Mental State 
and First-Episode Psychosis?: A Pilot Study, 250 RADIOLOGY 212, 217 (2009); 
Peter Milev et al., Initial Magnetic Resonance Imaging Volumetric Brain 
Measurements and Outcomes in Schizophrenia: A Prospective Longitudinal 
Study with 5-Year Follow-Up, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 608, 612 (2003); 
Christos Pantelis et al., Neuroanatomical Abnormalities Before and After 
Onset of Psychosis: A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal MRI Comparison, 361 
LANCET 281, 285–86 (2003). 
  
 
Specifically, participants had low levels of grey matter volume 
in the frontal and temporal lobes and cingulate gyrus,49 key 
areas associated with cognition and executive function such as 
decision-making and self-monitoring. Most importantly, these 
studies demonstrated that researchers can construct an image 
of risk from a brain scan that could be predictive of psychosis or 
schizophrenia.50 
The implications of both neuro- and gene-profiling of 
individuals very early in life for a psychiatric illness might 
qualitatively differ from the implications of profiling other 
medical conditions in childhood and adolescence.51 An extensive 
literature discusses the ethics of clinical and non-clinical uses 
of pediatric neuroimaging, from the fetus to the neonate to the 
adolescent.52 Although a number of ethical issues continue to 
be discussed, this paper is concerned with the ethical duties to 
minimize risk and maximize benefit, as well as the duty to 
appropriately and thoroughly describe the risks and benefits of 
imaging genetics for potential translation from bench to 
bedside.53 While some risks are associated with safety and 
efficacy, other ethical challenges involve describing the 
information produced by imaging genetics completely, 
accurately and meaningfully.54 
If endophenotypes for schizophrenia are detected during 
pediatric screening, children might be subjected to invasive and 
potentially harmful interventions. For example, prescribing 
psychopharmaceutical medication for children with conditions 
such as attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder is on the rise.55 
Early intervention in psychosis has a demonstrable benefit for 
                                                          
 49. See, e.g., Pantelis et al., supra note 48, at 285. 
 50. See, e.g., id. at 287 (stating that data from the authors’ study raise the 
possibility that MRI or other methods can determine which individuals at high 
risk for schizophrenia will develop psychosis). 
 51. Ilina Singh & Nikolas Rose, Biomarkers in Psychiatry, 460 NATURE 
202 (2009). 
 52. E.g., Andrew Fenton et al., Ethical Challenges and Interpretive 
Difficulties with Non-Clinical Applications of Pediatric fMRI, 9 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 3, 6–8 (2009). 
 53. See Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer Marshall, Pediatric Neuroimaging 
Ethics, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 147, 149 (2007). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Rick Mayes et al., ADHD and the Rise in Stimulant Use Among 
Children, 16 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 151, 151 (2008) (noting the 
“unprecedented jump” that occurred in the 1990s in the number of children 
using drugs such as stimulants for ADHD). 
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prognosis.56 Therefore, it is foreseeable that children who are 
carriers of certain biomarkers or endophenotypes for 
schizophrenia may be prescribed psychotropic medications 
prior to the onset of symptoms. This clinical evaluation 
requires a particularly careful examination because of the 
recent Food and Drug Administration warnings of the 
increased risk of suicide in children and adolescents who are 
prescribed selective serotonin/norepinephrine reuptake 
inhibitors (e.g., fluexotine and venlafaxine).57 In addition, 
children metabolize psychopharmaceuticals differently than 
adults, likely due to ways in which genetics modulate the 
activity of enzymes in drug metabolism.58 The administration 
of pharmaceuticals on the basis of predictive diagnostic criteria 
could result in the emergence of an iatrogenic disorder.59 Over-
treating with antipsychotics based on a vague understanding of 
risk variables is unsupported. 
Individuals tend to experience their first episode of 
psychosis at an age when the law may not permit them to 
provide consent to their own treatment.60 Thus, early 
identification of biomarkers may raise questions about the 
decisional capacity of both children and adolescents, as well as 
their ability to appreciate the risks and benefits associated with 
early intervention for psychosis. Concerns about mental 
competence may be particularly troublesome for some older 
adolescents who may be beginning to enjoy some liberty in 
other areas of their lives and, perhaps, even some autonomy in 
their own medical decision-making. Balancing duties to protect 
children and adolescents when they may be most vulnerable, 
while negotiating space for autonomy, will be a significant 
challenge. 
Skepticism exists about whether data averaged over 
groups of participants, a common practice in research studies 
                                                          
 56. Richard Jed Wyatt & Ioline D. Henter, The Effects of Early and 
Sustained Intervention on the Long-Term Morbidity of Schizophrenia, 32 J. 
PSYCHIATRIC RES. 169, 170 (1998). 
 57. Mark Olfson et al., Antidepressant Drug Therapy and Suicide in 
Severely Depressed Children and Adults: A Case-Control Study, 63 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 865, 865, 867 (2006). 
 58. Anders Rane, Phenotyping of Drug Metabolism in Infants and 
Children: Potentials and Problems, 104 PEDIATRICS 640 passim (1999). 
 59. Walter Glannon, Neuroethics, 20 BIOETHICS 37, 44 (2006). 
 60. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 31, at 307 (stating that the age of onset 
for schizophrenia typically begins in the late teens). 
  
 
with either adults or children, can truly predict pathology in a 
robust way for a specific person.61 Research that examines 
endophenotypes in schizophrenia tends to have limited effect 
sizes, as studies rely on group averages with respect to brain 
features62 and use small samples. Therefore, the picture 
produced by imaging studies of the “schizophrenic” brain, for 
example, is not of the brain of any specific person, let alone the 
brain of an actual human being.63 Research that seeks to 
elucidate pathology on an individual level must consider the 
differences of human structural, metabolic and chemical brain 
signatures; clinically this diversity will have an inevitable 
impact on monitoring of therapeutic interventions.64 If used in 
isolation, endophenotypes may not be strong indicators of the 
existence of pathology: the endophenotype represents a 
correlation, rather than a causal explanation.65 Due to the high 
rates of intra- and inter-individual variability, at this time it 
would be premature to depend on images of brains with activity 
linked to genetic effects as objective clinical or legal evidence.66 
The identification of clinically relevant endophenotypes 
will require a combined focus on clinical phenomenology, 
narratives, personal and family history, molecular and genetic 
markers, neuroanatomical, neurophysiological, and 
neurocognitive processing mechanisms.67 Biomarkers, and by 
extension endophenotypes, will thus remain merely a 
statistical probability for the time being. 
                                                          
 61. See Grace E. Jackson, A Curious Consensus: “Brain Scans Prove 
Disease”?, 8 ETHICAL HUM. PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 55, 57–58 (2006). 
 62. See id. at 58. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Laura Huber, Imaging the Brain: Visualising “Pathological Entities”?: 
Searching for Reliable Protocols Within Psychiatry and Their Impact on the 
Understanding of Psychiatric Diseases, 6 POIESIS & PRAXIS 27, 32 (2009). 
 65. See id. at 33–34. 
 66. See Dara S. Manoach et al., Test-Retest Reliability of a Functional 
MRI Working Memory Paradigm in Normal and Schizophrenic Subjects, 158 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 955, 958 (2001) (stating that study findings suggest it is 
important to demonstrate reliability in repeated fMRI studies of schizophrenic 
subjects). 
 67. See Jason Scott Robert, Gene Maps, Brain Scans, and Psychiatric 
Nosology, 16 CAMBRIDGE. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 209, 215–16 (2007) 
(advocating an integrative approach to the identification of endophenotypes). 
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C.  IMAGING GENETICS AND THE OBJECTIVE-SELF IN 
SCHIZOPHRENIA 
Both health professionals and the lay public have a vested 
interest in achieving positive health outcomes. Since scientific 
and technological research is the portal to modern knowledge 
about health and illness, the desire for improved health 
outcomes may result in an increased attribution of objectivity 
by physicians and patients to brain scans and genetic data.68 
This dialectical process is what Joseph Dumit refers to as the 
objective-self: the “set of acts that concerns our brains and our 
bodies deriving from received-facts of science and medicine.”69 
The objective-self is how people understand brains and bodies 
as biologic material. Objective-selves challenge generally 
accepted notions of normality as the “normal” brain is 
compared to its abnormal counterpart.70 
The possible consequences of imaging genetics screening in 
psychiatry, and for schizophrenia specifically, requires ethical 
examination of the potential impact of an objective-self. One 
concern is the communication of risk. Inappropriate 
communication of imaging genetics information may affect a 
person’s perception of his ability to manage symptoms. 
Statistics, including measures of probability and risk, are 
difficult to comprehend, and framing effects—especially as 
people try to comprehend odds ratios—can influence their 
interpretation of the information.71 Using imaging genetics 
tools to screen for psychopathology may inadvertently elevate 
levels of fear and anxiety about developing a mental illness. 
The fear of being at risk for a self-altering disorder such as 
schizophrenia may affect choices a person makes for education, 
employment, or other social and life plans. Indeed, a disorder of 
the self may also impact the extent to which ambitious life 
goals are supported by friends and family.72 
                                                          
 68. Christian G. Huber, Interdependence of Theoretical Concepts and 
Neuroimaging Data, 6 POIESIS & PRAXIS 203, 205 (2009).  
 69. Dumit, supra note 30, at 39. 
 70. See id. at 39–40. 
 71. See A. J. Lloyd, The Extent of Patients’ Understanding of the Risk of 
Treatment, 10 QUALITY HEALTH CARE i14, i17 (2001) (stating that “[w]hile 
clinicians typically report risk information as percentages or relative risks, . . . 
people may code information qualitatively.”). 
 72. Cheryl Corcoran et al., Prodromal Interventions for Schizophrenia 
Vulnerability: The Risks of Being “At Risk”, 73 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 173, 177 
(2005). 
  
 
Moreover, the way in which the candidate gene is 
expressed in the brain may become intimately linked with 
personal identity. The objective-self and identity may be 
considered schizophrenic if both the genes and the brain are 
affected. A schizophrenic identity may be further embedded in 
societal and cultural attitudes, and in the experiences of an 
affected individual in the world. 
D.  IMAGING GENETICS AND FALSE POSITIVES 
Imaging genetics is a combined process: it involves both a 
genome scan and a brain scan, and the two types of knowledge 
produced are expected to be in a causal relationship. Given the 
increasing trend toward genome-wide association studies in 
biopsychiatry, there is a rapidly growing pool of information on 
the neuronal expression of genes. The identification of 
numerous prospective endophenotypes raises the problem of 
false positives, because candidate genes—including those not 
well understood—will be directly linked to imaged brain 
structures and function. For our purposes, false positives will 
be defined in two ways. First, false positives will be erroneous 
conclusions made after a gene variant of unclear relevance is 
linked with high-dimensional imaging information.73 This 
extends to a second, looser definition, borrowing from Jerome 
Wakefield, that false positives may be “non-disorder” conditions 
that meet some or the majority of the criteria for a disorder 
such as schizophrenia.74 The individual is thus treated—in both 
the medical and relational sense—as a member of the 
diagnostic group. 
                                                          
 73. Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg et al., False Positives in Imaging Genetics, 
40 NEUROIMAGE 655, 659 (2008) (stating that “given the absence of reliable 
information on the heritability and reliability of the majority of imaging 
phenotypes in current usage, a statistically significant result in neuroimaging 
is by itself not sufficient to establish that a given polymorphism is functional, 
and the complex nature of psychiatric disease predicts that the isolated 
genetics evidence for association will usually not be unequivocal for a given 
variant.”). 
 74. Jerome C. Wakefield & Michael First, Clarifying the Distinction 
Between Disorder and Non-Disorder: Confronting the Overdiagnosis (“False 
Positives”) Problem in DSM-V, in ADVANCING DSM: DILEMMAS IN 
PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 23, 24 (Katharine A. Phillips et al. eds., 2003); see 
generally, ALAN V. HOROWITZ & JEROME C WAKEFIELD, THE LOSS OF 
SADNESS: HOW PSYCHIATRY TRANSFORMED NORMAL DISORDER INTO 
DEPRESSIVE DISORDER (2007); Jerome C. Wakefield, What Makes a Mental 
Disorder Mental?, 13 PHIL. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 123, 129 (2006) (arguing 
that “some mental disorders may not involve neurologic dysfunction”). 
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At this time, only a few select biomarkers and 
endophenotypes represent a somewhat reliable indication of 
increased risk for psychiatric illness. Even if the reliability, 
validity, and specificity of imaging genetic tests are improved 
for schizophrenia, some number of false positives and 
diagnostic errors will still occur. Effective treatments must be 
developed in order for false positive rates even as low as 5 
percent75 to be tolerated.76 How the information produced by 
imaging genetics, including false-positive results, will be 
handled by the law is the topic to which we turn next. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW AND JUSTICE 
A.  NEUROGENETICS AND THE LAW 
There has been considerable discussion in academic 
literature about the current and potential uses of neuroscience 
and neurotechnology in the legal system,77 particularly because 
of the concern that the law has with mental states.78 When 
DNA evidence was first admitted in the courts, it became a 
powerful evidentiary tool, not because it demonstrated the 
existence of mental states, but because it represented 
seemingly objective and indisputable hard facts.79 The 
                                                          
 75. See Meyer-Lindenberg et al., supra note 73, at 659 (stating that 
expected statistical rate of false positives is 5 percent). 
 76. Cf. Judy Illes et al., Prospects for Prediction: Ethics Analysis of 
Neuroimaging in Alzheimer’s Disease, 1097 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 278, 283 
(2007) (stating that, in the context of neuroimaging for Alzheimer’s Disease, 
“[t]he ethical issues pertaining to which clinical populations should be tested 
will depend largely on whether or not a definitive treatment becomes 
available.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Neil K. Aggarwal, Neuroimaging, Culture and Forensic 
Psychiatry, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY& L. 239, 240 (2009); Henry T. Greely 
& Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for 
Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 390–94, 405–20 (2007) ); Joshua Greene 
& Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 
1775–76, 1778–81 (2004); Owen D. Jones, Law, Evolution, and the Brain: 
Applications and Open Questions, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y: 
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1697 passim (2004); Susan M. Wolf, Neurolaw: The Big 
Question, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 21, 21–22 (2008). 
 78. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 77, at 1775. 
 79. See Jay D. Aronson, DNA Fingerprinting on Trial: The Dramatic 
History of a New Forensic Technique, 29 ENDEAVOUR 126, 128 (2005) (stating 
that “by early 1986, DNA evidence had been accepted by the [U.K.] 
magistrate’s court as valid and reliable”). 
  
 
combined use of DNA and imaging genetics information might 
provide a similarly powerful tool, and, instead, may offer more 
reliable and valid evidence of the existence of limited mental 
capacity or cognitive deficits commonly associated with a 
condition, even before an individual is symptomatic. Initially, 
the threat of introducing DNA evidence was an influential and 
intimidating tactic, which, at times, distracted the jury’s 
attention from its status as an “untried and untested 
technology.”80 At the present time, use of imaging genetics 
information as legal evidence is far from reality, particularly 
since neuroimaging data themselves are not ready for legal 
prime time. 
The presence or absence of genetic or clinical traits 
associated with a condition such as schizophrenia does not 
itself cause illicit behavior or even a disorder itself.81 Many 
individuals who are not carriers or do not have full-blown 
psychiatric conditions have committed many crimes. 
Conversely, those with the genes or condition may commit no 
illicit acts. What the presence of risk traits does imply, 
however, is that the pre-symptomatic individual may already 
possess certain difficulties relating to cognitive function and 
mental capacity. A positive result in an imaging genetics study 
could be used to argue against the mental competence to stand 
trial.82 In other cases, this information may be used to argue 
that the individual does not have the requisite mens rea to be 
found guilty of certain offense, and thus can be used to support 
a less retributive sentence.83 
B.  NEUROGENETICS AND JUSTICE 
A more immediate and pragmatic challenge posed by the 
production of imaging genetics knowledge concerns the ethical 
issue of justice. Justice necessitates consideration of the 
potential harms that may arise for individuals or communities 
resulting from research participation, or in clinical 
                                                          
 80. Id. at 126; Patrick Haines, Embracing the DNA Fingerprint Act, 5 J. 
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 629, 640 (2007). 
 81. Jerome C. Wakefield, The Measurement of Mental Disorder, in A 
HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF MENTAL HEALTH 29, 39–40, 57 (Alan V. 
Horwitz & Teresa L. Scheid eds., 1999). 
 82. Walter Sinnot-Armstrong et al., Brain Images as Legal Evidence, 5 
EPISTEME 359, 360 (2008). 
 83. Greene & Cohen, supra note 77, at 1775, 1783; Sinnot-Armstrong et 
al., supra note 82 at, 360. 
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implementation of, or interaction with, the technology. In the 
spirit of John Rawls’s “distributive justice,”84 justice involves 
fairness in not only the equitable distribution of risks, but also 
in the equitable distribution and access to research benefits 
and clinical technology. 
The ethics of predictive genetics in the United States has 
been widely discussed, especially in the context of insurability 
and employability.85 Similar scholarly and policy initiatives 
have been emerging for neuroimaging. Key ethical issues are 
privacy and confidentiality.86 One issue of continuing concern is 
how health insurers and employers may use genetic or imaging 
knowledge that suggests a possibility of a pre-existing disorder 
to prevent people from accessing health insurance. Diagnosing 
asymptomatic individuals early in life may raise concerns 
similar to those at issue raised by newborn screening. 
Protection of confidentiality and ensuring privacy of genetic 
and imaging information are of particular importance. For a 
highly stigmatized condition such as schizophrenia, these 
challenges are compounded. 
Positive steps have recently been taken at the federal level 
with the enactment of the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).87 Though not a panacea, GINA 
moves to ensure that results from predictive genetic testing will 
not be an impediment to receiving medical insurance or gaining 
employment.88 While ethical issues of discrimination, privacy, 
and confidentiality of information are not unique to 
schizophrenia or genetics, as technologies such as imaging 
genetics become more sensitive and powerful, information 
derived from the genome will impact all aspects of health care 
                                                          
 84. See generally JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001). 
 85. E.g., Paul W. Brandt-Rauf & Sherry I. Brandt-Rauf, Genetic Testing in 
the Workplace: Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications, 15 AM. REV. PUB. 
HEALTH 139 (2004); K.G. Fulda & K.Lykens, Ethical Issues in Predictive 
Genetic Testing: A Public Health Perspective, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 143, 144 
(2006). 
 86. See, e.g., Jinger G. Hoop, Ethical Considerations in Psychiatric 
Genetics, 16 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 322, 329 (2008) (discussing the potential 
unfairness that genetic information could produce in the insurance context). 
 87. Pub. L. No. 110–233, 122 Stat. 188 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 29 U.S.C.); see also Kathy L. Hudson et al., Keeping Pace with the 
Times – The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 358 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2661, 2661 (2009). 
 88. Hudson et al., supra note 87, at 2662. 
  
 
and social services. 
If imaging genetics proves both reliable and valid, existing 
divisions in access to health care will also be affected. If 
imaging genetic tests were to become a standard of care or 
commercialized, or made available to individuals universally or 
through third-party coverage, the potential impact on the 
public health systems could be vast. By contrast, because 
psychiatric illness disproportionately affects lower-income 
populations89 and public forms of health care insurance remain 
hotly debated, financial barriers might significantly limit 
access to neuroimaging genetic technologies for the very people 
most likely to benefit from them. 
Large-scale screening procedures can only be justified on 
social, economic, and ethical grounds if sustainable follow-up is 
in place for people identified as being high-risk and if a reliable, 
effective, and safe treatment is available.90 Scientific and 
technological development of imaging genetics, with robust 
clinical trials testing early intervention for asymptomatic high-
risk individuals, will determine whether early intervention for 
those identified by imaging genetics will reduce morbidity and 
mortality, and will improve quality of life.91 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Humans have an insatiable appetite for information and 
innovation. History shows that when a new medical device or 
method is rolled out after proven validity in the laboratory, 
demand for that innovation is great. Currently, the ability of 
neuroscience and genetics—applied together or separately—to 
offer a robust explanation of psychiatric disorders is not yet 
demonstrated due to many remaining methodological and 
epistemological limitations.92 As Meyer-Lindenberg et al. 
assert: 
[G]iven the absence of reliable information on the heritability and 
                                                          
 89. See NAT’L CTR FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2008 WITH SPECIAL FEATURE ON 
THE HEALTH OF YOUNG ADULTS 30 (2008). 
 90. See Illes et al., supra note 76 at 283–85 (proposing criteria for use of 
screening for Alzheimer’s disease). 
 91. See Wayne D. Hall et al., The Prediction of Disease Risk in Genomic 
Medicine, 5 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY ORG. REP. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S22, S25 
(2004). 
 92. See generally Wakefield & First, supra note 74, at 23–56 (noting the 
shortcomings of the DSM definition of mental disorder). 
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reliability of the majority of imaging phenotypes in current usage, a 
statistically significant result in neuroimaging is by itself not 
sufficient to establish that a given polymorphism is functional, and 
the complex nature of psychiatric disease predicts that the isolated 
genetics evidence for association will usually not be unequivocal for a 
given variant.93 
The ability to better predict psychiatric illness could lead to 
improved diagnosis and treatment through the early 
identification of individuals who are at high biological risk. 
Benefits may follow from earlier treatment options, both for 
individuals and for society more generally. At the very least, 
imaging genetics may reinforce the strong organic component of 
psychiatric illness. However, risks of a biopsychiatry that 
focuses only on the combination of abnormal brain mechanisms 
and genetics, rather than on the integrated person as a being-
among-others, must be minimized. It is currently too early to 
suggest that imaging genetics will become a clinical reality or 
tool for legal decision-making; too many scientific and 
technological problems regarding the application of the 
technology remain to be solved. Nonetheless, now is the time to 
consider the ethical, legal, and social issues, in order to ensure 
benefit and impact for the future. There has been too little 
consideration of these issues in imaging genetics—a powerful 
technology linking neuroscience and genetics. This gap can be 
filled by interdisciplinary collaboration and attention to public 
health and legal challenges. Efforts to fill that gap must 
integrate societal, clinical, and legal implications in a way that 
is both pragmatic and open-minded.94 Meanwhile, the science 
calls for more work. Further evaluation and empirical testing is 
needed for many conditions that affect executive function and 
decision-making, including schizophrenia. 
 
                                                          
 93. Meyer-Lindenberg et al., supra note 73 at 659. 
 94. Adrian Carter et al., Scare-Mongering and the Anticipatory Ethics of 
Experimental Technologies, 9 AM. J. BIOETHICS 47, 48 (2009) (arguing for a 
focus on plausible potential harms from participation in clinical trials). 
